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India’s migrant crisis is a product of its post-1991 development strategy and the
unaccountable nature of the prime minister’s office. 
Narendar Pani
Among the more tragic images of the COVID-19
pandemic in India are those related to deaths that
are not directly the result of the coronavirus. There
is the haunting image of a two-year-old trying to
wake up her dead mother on a railway platform.
The mother had died of starvation as she sought to
return to her village after the lockdown following
the pandemic resulted in her losing her job in the
city. There were the workers who were mowed
down by India’s unruly traffic as they tried to find
their way to their villages, sometimes more than a
thousand kilometres away, on foot. The hundreds
of migrant lives lost were a reminder of just how
devastating the unstable mix of textbook economics and political individualism can be.
The economic reform path India has followed since the 1990s has been marked by a
strict adherence to elementary mainstream economics. The reforms have had their
successes, as when previously constrained sectors of the economy registered
significantly higher growth rates. The celebrations around these sporadic successes
have largely blinded policy makers to the assumptions of mainstream economics that
were not consistent with the Indian reality. High on the list of such assumptions is that
of the perfect mobility of labour.
We only need to step back for a moment and consider the larger transformation taking
place in the Indian economy to recognize the sheer magnitude of this assumption, and
just how far it is from reality. For all the focus on India’s emerging economy status, the
real challenge is a much more mundane and painful one. Tens of millions of workers
are being forced out of agriculture. India’s inheritance laws require property, including
agricultural land, to be divided among members of the succeeding generation. This
results in smaller and less viable farms, forcing the smaller cultivators to either become
agricultural labour or move out of agriculture altogether. Arthur Lewis and his
successors would expect these workers to be absorbed in higher productivity, and hence
higher wage, urban industries. But the transformation of rural agricultural workers to
urban industrial ones is neither smooth nor painless.
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“Agricultural workers from the north and east of India, seeking non-agricultural
opportunities to the south and west of the country, have responded to the divergence
between nominal and real wages with a strategy of their own. They have sought to earn
higher urban wages even as they spend their earnings in their lower priced villages.”
The first challenge workers have to overcome is a spatial one. The districts where
workers are being forced out of agriculture are largely to the north and the east of India.
There are districts in this part of the country where a major portion of workers cannot
find work for even six months in a year. These marginal workers, as the Census of India
classifies them, are forced to look outside their villages for work. The non-agricultural
work options available to them—formal or informal, legal or illegal—are extremely
limited in the vicinity of their villages. The engines of economic growth that have
emerged in India, particularly after 1991, are concentrated to the south and the west of
the country. Distance then becomes a major challenge agricultural workers in India
have to overcome to realize the economists’ expectation of a movement from agriculture
to industry.
The challenge of distance is compounded by a second constraint: raising migration
capital to move from village to city. There are those at the very bottom of the rural
economic hierarchy who would struggle to even raise the costs of transportation to the
city, let alone the additional resources required for urban survival until they find a job.
Even those who are just above the poverty line could find the costs of a permanent
migration of their families to the city prohibitive. Those who determine the course of
Indian cities are preoccupied with these urban centres being compared with
metropolises in the West. A substantial portion of public investment in Indian cities is
on glamourous projects from international airports to expressways. Combined with a
policy stance that these projects must be paid for by user fees, this strategy has raised
the cost of living in the city. While workers can expect higher nominal wages in the city,
their real wages are depressed by the cost of urban living.
Agricultural workers from the north and east of India, seeking non-agricultural
opportunities to the south and west of the country, have responded to the divergence
between nominal and real wages with a strategy of their own. They have sought to earn
higher urban wages even as they spend their earnings in their lower priced villages. This
strategy typically involves one or more members of a family working in the city while
the rest of the family stays in the village. The worker lives in extremely congested
conditions in the city. A survey done by the National Institute of Advanced Studies,
India, showed that migrant workers in the south Indian metropolis of Bengaluru spent
very little in the city. The workers shared already congested rooms and owned very few
assets in the city. Apart from a mobile phone to keep in touch with their family, the rest
of their assets were in the household in the village. The dualism of a family split
between the city and the village is the price the worker pays to survive the
transformation from agriculture to non-agriculture.
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The extent of this phenomenon is usually buried under the narrative of India’s rising
metropolises. The stories of these metropolises are typically generated around the built
spaces that are created, rather than the labour that creates them. The COVID-19
pandemic has cracked this façade. The lockdown following the pandemic saw migrant
workers losing their jobs. The sudden loss of jobs meant that they many a time did not
get the wages that were due to them. The contractors who had brought them to the city
often disappeared. Without the wages to pay their rents, a large number of workers
were evicted from their shared, rented accommodation in the city. They had little option
but to find their way back to their villages.
“For all the unexpected success India can legitimately claim in maintaining a democracy
over decades, its policy making process remains largely individual-centric, lending itself
to authoritarian tendencies.”
Moving tens of millions of workers over thousands of kilometres would have been a
challenge at the best of times. This phenomenally difficult task was made into a tragedy
by the government ensuring migrant workers were not given the benefit of time. Prime
Minister Modi went on national television at 8 p.m. on March 24 to announce that there
would be a lockdown from March 25 – the workers had just four late-night hours to
return to their villages. Some of the workers, whose villages were within a radius of a
couple of hundred kilometres from the city, did manage to react quickly enough to make
the trip before the lockdown was strictly enforced. But since the bulk of the migrants
were displaced from agriculture to the north and east of the country to find work in
cities to the south and west of India, they typically found themselves stranded more
than a thousand kilometres away from their village homes. With no trains or buses
available and no place to live in the city, they began to walk home. Some of them
scrambled on top of fully loaded trucks, and fell prey to India’s notoriously
unpredictable highway traffic. Others slept on railway tracks to avoid the snakes on the
grass around them, thinking the trains were not running. Unfortunately for some of
them, the freight trains were still running and could not spot them in the dark.
It is tempting to attribute this escalation in the non-virus costs of the pandemic to Prime
Minister Modi’s idiosyncrasies. His penchant for the 8 p.m. slot for his dramatic
televised announcements may or may not have something to do with primetime
television, but it gives very little time for those who are affected to react. This could be
justified in the case of measures such as demonetization, which took the majority of
Indian currency out of circulation, as giving the corrupt little time to escape. But there is
little merit to find in a decision that leaves tens of millions of workers stranded.
A preoccupation with Prime Minister Modi’s methods however hides a more
fundamental difficulty with the Indian political process. For all the unexpected success
India can legitimately claim in maintaining a democracy over decades, its policy making
process remains largely individual-centric, lending itself to authoritarian tendencies.
This authoritarian orientation of the office of India’s prime minister can be traced back
to the origins of the world’s largest democracy. When India gained independence as a
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developing country of great diversity, few gave it a chance of surviving as a democracy.
Its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, recognized the challenge of making policy
for the country as a whole through a parliament whose members represented very local
interests. He responded by setting up a policy-making mechanism, including the
Planning Commission, a now-defunct institution that prepared India’s five-year plans,
that reported directly to him and not to his cabinet.
The separation of policy making from the democratic exercise was consolidated by later
prime ministers. Indira Gandhi functioned with a kitchen cabinet and an enlarged
prime minister’s office. Rajiv Gandhi institutionalized the distinction through the anti-
defection law. Parliamentarians now risked losing their membership of parliament if
they voted against the party leadership. In the case of the ruling party that was the
prime minister. Even when a political lightweight like Manmohan Singh was prime
minister, he was seen to be representing the power of Sonia Gandhi, rather than the
collective wisdom of his cabinet.
This democratically elected authoritarianism has had its implications for the
functioning of Indian politics between elections. Once a leader is elected, they get a free
hand in policy making over the next five years. Since this power cannot be challenged in
India’s democratic institutions it is questioned only in courts or on the streets. The
ruling political dispensation, in turn, responds to such challenges by creating and using
laws that are better suited to authoritarian regimes.
Democratically elected authoritarianism has had its consequences for the course India
has taken, and will continue to influence the path the country takes in the coming years.
It can lead to decisions that have not had the critical scrutiny that democracy provides.
A government that times the waves in its popularity to match election cycles can carry
out measures that harm large numbers within the country in the period between
elections. Prime Minister Modi’s demonetization caused huge economic damage to
those dependent on the informal sector, but it could be brushed aside at election time
through an aggressive anti-Pakistan campaign.
The COVID-19 pandemic placed the dramatic gestures Prime Minister Modi uses to
build a political image of a decisive leader, against the needs of tens of millions of
migrant workers. In the rather cynical domain of Indian politics the loss of life may well
be seen as no more than collateral damage. The shortage of migrant labour, and the
resultant higher wages, are also likely to be swept under the carpet of economic jargon.
But it may be time to systematically evaluate the costs of India’s potent mix of
democratically elected authoritarianism and an unquestioning faith in the assumptions
of textbook mainstream economics.
Narendar Pani is Professor and Dean of the School of Social Sciences at the National
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This article launches a series on COVID-19 and internal migration. It is
published in partnership with the Cities and Human Mobility Research
Collaborative, an initiative of the Zolberg Institute on Migration and
Mobility.
5/5
